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I Introduction 
The relationship between the International Criminal Court (hereinafter 
referred to as ‗ICC‘ or ‗the Court‘) and the United Nations Security 
Council has been extensively discussed in academic debate since the 
early stages of the negotiations leading to the Rome Statute for the 
establishment of an International Criminal Court. 1 The Rome Statute 
itself can be described as a carefully balanced legal and political 
approach to combating impunity.2 But is it truly a robust mechanism to 
fully protect the independence of the Court and to safeguard it from 
political influence? 3  
The Rome Statute is a treaty under international law and the 
International Criminal Court an independent organization under 
international law. The Security Council is a political organ, it is 
composed of Member States to the United Nations its mandate is to 
maintain and restore international peace and security.4 In international 
law there is no definite distinction regarding ‗checks and balances‘ as it 
                                            
1
 The Rome Statute was adopted on 17 July 1998 and went into effect on 1 July 2002. 
The ICC began operations in The Hague on 11 March 2003. For a comprehensive 
summary, see Werle, Gerhard. Principles of International Criminal Law. The Hague: 
TMC Asser Press, (2005) 22 et seq. 
2
 Kirsch, Philippe, John T. Holmes, and Mora Johnson. "International Tribunals and 
Courts." In The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st century, edited by 
David M. Malone, 281-294. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, (2004) 287. 
3
 Song, Sang-Hyun. "The Independence of the ICC and Safeguards Against Political 
Influence - A paper prepared for the Symposium on the International Criminal Court." 
International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice. February 3-4, 
(2007) 
http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/ICC%20Reports/IndependenceofICC.
pdf (accessed September 23, 2009), 5. 
4
 See: Article 39 of Charter of the United Nations (hereinafter referred to as UN 
Charter); See: Dinstein, Yoram. War Aggression and Self-Defence. 3. Edition. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2008) 279 et seq. 
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is common in domestic legal systems. In the Rome Statute these 
powers intermingle. In other words, the Rome Statute is a Code of 
International Crimes giving jurisdiction to the ICC as the judiciary, and it 
also defines the relationship to the United Nations and the Security 
Council, the executive on an international level. Taking into account 
that a clear separation of powers does not exist, it is important to define 
the balance of powers as laid down in the Rome Statute. 
Furthermore the Rome Statute is not only an international treaty, but it 
allows for an International Criminal Court to be established. The Rome 
Statute is a very powerful treaty. On its basis the ICC may take into 
custody, convict and punish human beings. It has the right to interfere 
in basic human rights. Such a powerful institution has to have a strict 
legal basis. Material elements of crimes as well as procedural matters 
have to be defined unambiguously and stringent.  
Is the balance of power between the Security Council and the ICC 
strictly defined in the Rome Statute? And should this determined 
balance of power have any effect on solving the jurisdictional issues 
regarding the, yet undefined, crime of aggression? 
Just recently attention was drawn to issues regarding the relationship 
between the ICC and the Security Council. In 2005, for the first time, 
the Security Council by means of a resolution, acting under Chapter VII 
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of the United Nations Charter5, referred a situation to the ICC.6 
Resolution 1593 entailed discussions on complementarity, the financing 
scheme of the Court and the overall relationship of the two institutions. 
In addition to this recent development, the Special Working Group for 
the Crime of Aggression is preparing its Review Conference 2010, 
where the main issue to be discussed is the intended role of the 
Security Council when defining the crime of aggression.  
Fletcher and Ohlin advocate the theory of the ICC being two courts in 
one.7 Describing that the ICC in consideration of its funding scheme 
and provisions on complementarity, has to be seen as two separate 
courts: on the one hand as an independent criminal court and on the 
other hand, in the case of referrals by the SC, as an organ for restoring 
peace and security that transcends the classic aims of criminal law to 
adjudicate individual guilt.8 Of interest in that context is also the 
argument that the ICC is intended to be an instrument which the 
Council will make use of in fulfilling its task to maintain and restore 
international peace and security.9 
Therefore this paper has two aims. Firstly, to define a certain pattern of 
power between the ICC and the Security Council, and secondly, 
                                            
5
 Charter of the United Nations, signed at San Francisco on 26 June 1945 (hereinafter 
referred to as UN Charter). 
6
 UN-Security Council, Resolution 1593 of 31 March 2005, UN Doc. S/RES/1593 
(2005). 
7
 Fletcher, George P., and Jens David Ohlin. "The ICC - Two Courts in One?" Journal 
of International Criminal Justice (2006), 428-433. 
8
 Fletcher, Ohlin (2006), 428. 
9
 Kirsch, Holmes and Johnson (2004), 287. 
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defining the Security Council`s role, according to this power pattern, for 
the crime of aggression. 
The provisions influencing the relationship between the ICC and the 
Security Council are dealt with in consideration of their development 
from the 1994 ILC Draft Statute to the Rome Statute. The attention will 
be drawn to the fact that in the ILC Draft the jurisdictional issues 
between the ICC and the Security Council were stipulated in one 
provision, Article 23 ILC Draft while they were split up in the Rome 
Statute. Therefore, in Chapter III, Articles 2, 5, 13, 16 and 115 of the 
Rome Statute, which concretely define the relationship of the two 
institutions, are analyzed by means of legal interpretation and 
discussed regarding the relevant issues entailed by Resolution 1593. 
The Relationship Agreement will be taken into account as well. The 
conclusion of this analysis will try to define a power pattern. Hence, it 
will be described if the relationship and the balance of power between 
the ICC and the Security Council is a reoccurring thread which proofs to 
be a concept in itself in the Rome Statute. In Chapter IV, the history of 
the crime of aggression is briefly addressed and an overview given on 
the discussions and preliminary results regarding the role of the 
Security Council for the exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression. Finally, in Chapter V, in a conclusion, the power pattern of 
the Rome Statute regarding the balance of power between the ICC and 
the Security Council is connected with the jurisdictional question of the 
crime of aggression, namely how the relationship between the Security 
Council and the ICC in the case of aggression ought to be defined.  
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II Historical and Legal Background 
―The aim of the drafters was to construct a Court that was independent, fair, 
impartial, effective, representative, and free from political influence.‖
 10
 
1. Drafting of the Rome Statute 
From today`s perspective the final milestone in the development of 
international criminal law was the entry into force of the Rome Statute 
as well as the creation of the ICC.11 How could that agreement be 
achieved wherein states voluntarily gave up some of their sovereignty? 
The true benchmark prior to the establishment of the ICC was the 1994 
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court (ILC Draft) prepared by 
the International Law Commission and submitted to the General 
Assembly the same year.12 After the establishment of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia13 and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda14 it was fully accepted that the Security Council 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter established international ad hoc 
                                            
10
 Cassese, Antonio, International Law (2005), 457. 
11
 Werle (2005), 18. 
12
 For a history of prior endeavors regarding an international criminal jurisdiction, see 
for example, Triffterer, Otto, ed. Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court. 2. Edition. Munich: C.H.Beck, (2008), 16 et seq.; Werle (2005), 18 et 
seq.; Cassese, Antonio, International Criminal Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
(2008), 317 et seq. 
13
 Security Council Resolution on the Establishment of the International Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia, Security Council Res. 827 (1993), UN SCOR, 48
th
 Year, UN 
Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). 
14
 Security Council Resolution on the Establishment of the International Tribunal for 
Rwanda, Security Council Res. 935, UN SCOR, 49
th
 Year, UN Doc. S/RES/935 
(1994); for an overview and evaluation regarding the relationship between the ICTY 
and the ICTR with the Security Council, see: Kirsch, Holmes and Johnson (2004), 282 
et seq. 
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tribunals in order to deal with the committed atrocities.15 However, after 
experiencing the costly and time consuming establishment of such ad 
hoc tribunals16 and the end of the Cold War, the time was ripe for a 
permanent International Criminal Court.17 For the first time the political 
overall conception was in favor of a consistent solution to fight 
international crimes. In the same year, the General Assembly appointed 
an ad hoc Committee18 which was later on succeeded by the 
Preparatory Committee (PrepCom).19 In the following years the texts of 
the ILC Draft were revised and an international conference was 
scheduled. The conference was finally held in Rome from 16 June to 17 
July 1998 with the intention to achieve an agreement upon a final 
statute for an international criminal court. During the preparatory 
process numerous proposals were submitted on a definition of the 
crimes, the question of complementarity20, as well as jurisdiction and 
procedural matters, judicial co-operation, penalties, general principles 
                                            
15
 Jain, Neha. "European Journal of International Law - A Separate Law for 
Peacekeepers: The Clash between the Security Council and the International Criminal 
Court." April (2005) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=908305# 
(accessed September 15, 2009), 3; Cassese (2008) 329; Lee, Roy S. "Introduction - 
The Rome Conference and Its Contributions to International Law." In The International 
Criminal Court - Issues, Negotiations, Results, edited by Roy S. Lee, 1-40. The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International (1999), 6. 
16
 Kurth, Michael E. Das Verhältnis des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofes zum UN-
Sicherheitsrat - Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Sicherheitsratsresolution 
1422 (2002). Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft (2005), 55; for further 
reasons advocating an International Criminal Court at the time, see Kurth (2005), 55 
et seq.; Lee (1999), 5. 
17
 Werle (2005), 20; Kirsch, Holmes and Johnson (2004), 286 et seq. 
18
 UN Doc. A/RES/49/53 (1994). 
19
 UN Doc. A/RES/50/46 (1995), participation in the PrepCom was open to all UN 
member states. 
20
 The underlying basis of this principle states that national courts enjoy priority in the 
exercise of jurisdiction, cf.: Cassese (2008), 343; Holmes, John T. „The Principle of 
Complimentarity.― In The International Criminal Court - Issues, Negotiations, Results, 
edited by Roy S. Lee, 41-78. The Hague: Kluwer Law International (1999), 41-78. 
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of criminal law and the composition and administration of the court.21 
Major concerns of many delegations, which remained controversial 
issues until the very end of the Conference in Rome, were the financing 
of the court and the question of the court`s relationship with the United 
Nations and the Security Council.22 
2. The role of the Security Council as engraved in the Charter 
of the United Nations 
The UN Charter envisages a genuine mechanism of collective 
Security.23 The Security Council is the United Nations organ entrusted 
with the task of activating and supervising this mechanism.24 Article 
24(1) UN Charter stipulates that the member states: 
―confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties 
under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.‖ 
The Security Council is composed of five permanent members (which 
enjoy the power to veto decisions by the Council), China, France, 
Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States, and ten non-
permanent members which are elected by the General Assembly for a 
two year term.25 
                                            
21
 Lee (1999), 7. 
22
 Lee (1999), 9; Bergsmo, Pejic, in: Triffterer, 598 marginal no. 8. 
23
 Dinstein (2008), 279. 
24
 Ibid; Bassiouni, M. Cherif, und Benjamin B. Ferencz. „The Crime Against Peace and 
Aggression: From its Origins to the ICC.― In International Criminal Law - Sources, 
Subjects and Contents, edited by M. Cherif Bassiouni, 207-242. Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers (2008), 217. 
25
 For more information see the homepage of the Security Council, 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/index.html (accessed on 10 October 2009). 
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Chapter VII of the UN Charter contains the relevant provisions 
regarding the ‗collective security system‘ (Articles 39-51). Article 39 UN 
Charter, which will be of further importance in the discussions about the 
power of the ICC and the Security Council in the Rome Statute, reads: 
―The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance 
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain and restore international peace and 
security.‖ 
The last words of Article 39 formulate its mandate for the international 
community – to maintain or restore international peace and security.26 
Therefore the Council is mandated with prevention and deterrence 
goals.27 It is the Council`s responsibility to determine the existence of a 
threat to the peace, a breach of peace or an act of aggression. ―Once 
that determination is made, the door is automatically opened to 
enforcement measures of a non-military or military kind.‖28 This 
determination has to remain within the limits of the Purposes and 
Principles of the Charter.29 
                                            
26
 Dinstein (2008), 280. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 1995. 
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3. Development of the Provisions Regulating the Relationship 
between the Security Council and the International Criminal 
Court – From the ILC Draft to the Rome Statute 
The powers of the Security Council, as envisaged in the ILC Draft were 
quite extensive.30 Generally speaking the ILC Draft was geared towards 
Security Council control.31 Regarding the relationship between the ICC 
and the SC, the ILC Draft defined two different basic areas of concern. 
First, the need for a defined link between the ICC and the Security 
Council was stressed (see Article 2 ILC Draft32). and second, in Article 
23 ILC Draft, three specific roles for the Security Council in the ICC`s 
regime were proposed: 
 The Security Council could refer matters to the Court 
pursuant to Chapter VII UN Charter (Article 23 (1) ILC 
Draft). 
 The SC`s right to a prior determination if an act of 
aggression occurred before the Court could deal with 
complaints regarding the crime of aggression (Article 23 
(2) ILC Draft). 
 If a situation is being dealt with by the Security Council 
under Chapter VII UN Charter, the Court could not 
                                            
30
 Cassese, International Criminal Law (2008), 329. 
31
 Williams, Schabas, in: Triffterer, 564 marginal no. 2; Schabas, William A. An 
Introduction to the International Criminal Court. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press (2004), 6. 
32
 Article 2 ILC Draft: „The President, with approval of the States parties to this Statute 
may conclude an agreement establishing an appropriate relationship between the 
Court and the United Nations.‖ 
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commence prosecution in the absence of an approval by 
the Security Council (Article 23 (3) ILC Draft). 
The view was widely shared that the Court should be established by 
means of a multilateral treaty as a judicial organ independent of the SC, 
in contrast to the ad hoc tribunals which had been established by way 
of a Security Council resolution.33 
a) Article 2 ILC Draft 
Article 2 ILC Draft proposed an agreement between the United Nations 
and the Court to be concluded. Without in depth discussion the wording 
of the Article 2 ILC Draft was slightly changed during the Preparatory 
Committees last session. That draft lead with minor changes to the final 
text of the provision adopted in Article 2 Rome Statute.34 It was left to 
the Relationship Agreement35 to regulate the Security Council`s and the 
ICC`s functional cooperation while preserving the Court`s 
independence as an judicial organ.36  
In contrast, Article 23 ILC Draft was highly discussed, since it touched 
upon some of the most complex and sensitive jurisdictional issues.37  
                                            
33
 Kurth (2005), 58; UN Doc. A/50/22 (1995), para. 15; for further details see: 
Marchesi, in: Triffterer, 64 marginal nos. 4 et seq. 
34
 Marchesi, in: Triffterer, 64 marginal nos. 2 and 3. 
35
 The Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the ICC and the United Nations 
(hereinafter referred to as Relationship Agreement) finally entered into force on 4 
October 2004, UN-Doc. ICC/ASP/3/15. 
36
 Marchesi, in: Triffterer, 66 marginal nos. 9 et seq. 
37
 Williams, Schabas, in: Triffterer, 563 marginal no. 1. 
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b) Article 23 (1) ILC Draft 
Article 23 (1) ILC Draft, the right of the Council to refer a matter to the 
ICC under Chapter VII UN Charter, was included with the objective to 
render the establishment of further ad hoc tribunals obsolete.38 In the 
Ad Hoc Committee, several delegations agreed with the ILC Draft`s 
provision to give the Council the power to refer certain matters to the 
Court.39 India, in contrast, bearing in mind the veto power of the 
permanent members of the Security Council, was opposed to the 
Security Council having any specific powers whatsoever in respect to 
the ICC.40  
It was accepted by most states that the Security Council should have a 
referral power but, to keep up the Court`s independence41, no power to 
refer specific cases against an individual.42 In the end at the Rome 
Conference the term ―situation‖ being the more general term in 
comparison to ―matter‖ was agreed upon regarding the referral power of 
the Security Council under Chapter VII UN Charter (compare Article 13 
                                            
38
 Yee, Lionel. "Chapter Four: The International Criminal Court and The Security 
Council - Articles 13(b) and 16." In The International Criminal Court - The Making of 
the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results, edited by Roy S. Lee, 143-152. The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International (1999) 146; Williams, Schabas, in: Triffterer 564 
marginal no. 4; Kurth (2005), 61.  
The right of the Council to establish ad hoc tribunals under Chapter VII UN Charta 
was fully accepted and the legitimacy was not to be seriously questioned anymore 
after the Tadic decision of 1995; see Prosecutor v. Tadic, ICTY (Trial Chamber), 
decision of 10 August 1995, paras. 1 et seq. 
39
 Williams, Schabas, in: Triffterer, 565 marginal no. 8; Wilmshurst, 39. 
40
 Kirsch, Holmes and Johnson (2004), 287; Williams, Schabas, in: Triffterer, 568 
marginal no. 13. 
41
 Kurth (2005), 65, see also: Berman, Franklin. "The Relationship between the 
International Criminal Court and the Security Council." In The International Criminal 
Court: Challenges to Achieving Justice and Accountability in the 21st Century, edited 
by Mark S. Ellis and Richard J. Goldstone, 274-280. Ney York: IDEBATE Press 
(2008), 250. 
42
 See: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, UN-Doc. A/50/22 (1995), para. 120. 
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(b) Rome Statute).43 Additionally it was discussed whether Security 
Council referrals could confer jurisdiction upon the ICC even in cases 
where the state concerned was not a party to the Statute or had not 
accepted the Court`s jurisdiction over the crime.44 Finally, formal 
requirements regulating that question were not addressed in Article 13 
Rome Statute.45  
The related question in dispute during the PrepCom was whether 
entrusting the prosecutor with an independent power to initiate 
investigations and to trigger the Court`s jurisdiction proprio motu.46 This 
question is of importance for the relationship of the Council and the 
Court insofar as such a prosecutorial power would enable independent 
and only legally motivated investigations, while Security Council or state 
referrals bring about the suspicion of political motives.47 At the last 
session of the Preparatory Committee in March – April 1998, there was 
still no agreement as to the role of the prosecutor in initiating 
investigations.48 Finally it was agreed upon was the solution that the 
prosecutor may open investigation into a situation on his own motion 
                                            
43
 For a list of arguments advocating the SC`s right to refer situations, see: Report of 
the 29
th
 United Nations Issues Conference, 2.  
44
 Yee (1999), 148. 
45
 Dascalopoulou-Livada, Phani. "Chapter 6 - The Principle of Complimentarity and 
Security Council Referrals." In The International Criminal Court and National 
Jurisdictions, edited by Mauro Politi and Frederica Gioia, 57-64. Hampshire: Ashgate, 
(2008), 58. 
46
 Williams, Schabas, in: Triffterer, 566 marginal nos. 9, 10; proprio motu (Latin):‖on 
his own impulse.‖ 
47
 Song (2007), 6. 
48
 Williams, Schabas, in: Triffterer, 567 marginal no. 10. 
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without a referral if he believes that there are reasonable grounds for 
such a step.49 
c) Article 23 (2) ILC Draft 
Article 23 (2) ILC Draft dealt with the trigger mechanism regarding acts 
of aggression. It provided that the Court‘s jurisdiction was subject to a 
prior determination of the Security Council asserting that an act of 
aggression had been committed. Concerns were raised regarding the 
requirement of such a determination, inter alia, stating that the 
permanent members could always veto a decision to that effect to 
protect themselves from the Court‘s jurisdiction. 50 Eventually, the 
discussion was put on hold due to the fact that the crime of aggression 
was included into the Courts jurisdiction but under the condition that the 
jurisdiction only be exercised after a definition of the crime had been 
agreed upon.51 Even though, it was agreed upon one important fact in 
Article 5 (2) Rome Statute. Article 5 (2) Rome Statute stipulates for the 
future definition having to be consistent with the relevant provisions of 
the Charter of the United Nations.52 
                                            
49
 Song (2007), 6. 
50
Regarding the discussions in the PrepCom see for example, UN-Doc. 
A/CONF.183/10 (1998), Annex I, Resolution F, para. 7. 
51
 Yee (1999), 146; During the PrepCom several alternative definitions were 
discussed without coming to a final compromise, for in depth description see: 
Bassiouni, Ferencz (2008), 236 et seq. 
52
 See also Blokker, Niels. „The Crime of Aggression and the United Nations Security 
Council.― Leiden Journal of International Law, 2007: 867-894; 876 et seq. 
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d) Article 23 (3) ILC Draft 
Article 23 (3) ILC Draft53 states that without an approval of the Council, 
the Court could not commence prosecution arising out of a threat to or 
a breach of peace or an act of aggression if it was dealt with by the 
Security Council under Chapter VII UN Charta. Many ILC members as 
well as states had objections towards that provision, given that the 
Security Council would have had the power to block prosecutions only 
by placing the situation on the agenda. The burden to monitor the SC`s 
agenda in order to determine whether a prosecution could be initiated 
was put upon the Court by the ILC Draft. The suggestion made by 
Article 23 (3) ILC Draft entailed long discussions.54 Three basic views 
were held.55 The first group was of the opinion that the Council`s power 
to block prosecutions had to be maintained and even extended to all 
situations regardless of whether the Council dealt with it under Chapter 
VII or not.56 The opposing view was that Article 23 (3) ILC Draft should 
be completely deleted.57 Thirdly, the opinion was expressed that some 
safeguard for the Charter position of the Security Council should be 
included but stressing that the ILC Draft`s provision was not adequate 
being too broad and vague.58 Most states, however, were opposed to 
                                            
53
 Article 23 (3) ILC Draft reads: ―No prosecution may be commenced under this 
Statute arising from a situation which is being dealt with by the Security Council as a 
threat to or breach of the peace or an act of aggression under Chapter VII of the 
Charter, unless the Security Council otherwise decides.‖ 
54
 On the diverging views regarding Article 23 (3) ILC Draft Statute see: 1995 Ad Hoc 
Committee Report, paras 125-125 and 1996 PrepCom Report Vol.1, paras 140-144. 
55
 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, UN-Doc. A/50/22 (1995), paras 124 et seq. 
56
 Bergsmo, Pejic, in: Triffterer, 596 marginal no. 3 with further references. 
57
 Ibid. 
58
 Ibid. 
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Article 23 (3) ILC Draft, ―as it would compromise the independence of 
the court, allowing a political body to control a judicial body thereby 
politicizing the court and undermining its independence and legitimacy. 
Justice could become a bargaining chip during peace negotiations. 
Granting this power to the Security Council also implies that justice can 
disrupt Security Council-sponsored peace negotiations, undermining 
growing international appreciation of the critical role justice plays in 
solidifying the peace.‖59 The breakthrough in the negotiations came with 
a proposal by Singapore in the PrepCom`s session of August 1997 (so 
called ‗Singapore compromise‘60), which led to a revision of Article 23 
(3) ILC Draft and, finally, to Article 16 Rome Statute. Article 16 Rome 
Statute, now, is a deferral competence of the Security Council for a 
period of twelve months if a resolution is adopted under Chapter VII UN 
Charter 
e) The Financing 
Finally, it is important to take a glance at the development of the 
financing scheme of the Court. Today, under Article 115 Rome Statute 
it is stipulated that the ICC is funded by State Parties and the United 
Nations. United Nations funding is particularly expected ―in relation to 
the expenses incurred due to referrals by the Security Council.‖61 The 
issue of the financing mechanism was raised during the PrepCom‘s last 
session in 1998. Three financing options were under discussion: It was 
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taken into consideration to finance the Court 1) exclusively through 
assessed contributions of State Parties; 2) exclusively through the 
budget of the United Nations; 3) or through a combination of those two 
sources of capital.62 The financial support exclusively through the 
United Nations fund was problematic as it was not expected that all 
members to the United Nations would become State Parties to the 
Statute. Therefore that funding scheme would have raised serious 
issues about state sovereignty and equity.63 Under the final provision of 
Article 115 of the Rome Statute, the Security Council can refer 
situations and the Rome Statute suggests that the budget for those 
referrals comes from the United Nations. However, the Rome Statute, 
as an international treaty cannot bind the United Nations. 
4.  Conclusion of Chapter II 
In the next Chapter the aforementioned provisions of the Rome Statute 
will be analyzed. From now on, it is essential to keep in mind that some 
of the most important provisions regarding the balance of power 
between the Security Council and the ICC (Articles 5 (2), 13 (b), 16) 
originally stem from one and the same article in the ILC Draft (Article 23 
ILC Draft). I will interpret the Rome Statute to uncover if there is still a 
stringent balance of power engraved in the Rome Statute.
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III The Rome Statute and the Security Council 
 ―The success of the International Criminal Court will in practice be 
determined by a number of relationships. There is its relationship to States 
Parties; [...] to the UN System in general; and to the UN Security Council in 
particular. None of these relationships is static; they will develop. [...] far and 
away the most important of them will prove to be the developing relationship 
with the Security Council.‖ (Sir Franklin Berman - head of the delegation of the 
United Kingdom to the Rome Conference, 1999)64 
1. The Power of the Security Council as laid down in the Rome 
Statute 
In the following some parts of the Preamble and Articles 2, 5, 13, 14 
and 115 Rome Statute will be interpreted. All those provisions regulate, 
in one way or another, the relationship between the Security Council 
and the ICC. 
Before starting the interpretation a brief overview of the powers of the 
Security Council as laid down in the United Nations Charter shall be 
given 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969 
(hereinafter referred to as Vienna Convention) contains in Articles 31 
and 32 the core requirements for the interpretation of international 
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treaties. The rules therein must be applied interpreting the Rome 
Statute as they are an expression of customary law-65 
Article 31 (1) states that 
―A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose.‖ 
In other words, a treaty must be interpreted literally (wording), 
systematically (other agreements/accords between the parties to the 
treaty) and teleological (the aim and purpose of the treaty rules and the 
treaty generally)66. Whereas the recourse to preparatory work and the 
history is only to be seen as a supplementary means of interpretation 
(Article 32 Vienna Convention).67 First, the ―ordinary meaning‖ of the 
relevant Articles of the Rome Statute, namely Articles 2, 5, 13, 16, 115, 
needs to be defined. Second, the context of the Articles will be 
analyzed in relation to other provisions of the Statute. Third, the ―object 
and purpose‖ of the Rome Statute will be analyzed in context of all the 
relevant Articles.68 In that way one can disclose the power pattern as 
laid down in the Rome Statute. 
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a)  Article 2 Rome Statute – Relationship of the Court with the 
United Nations 
―The Court shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations through 
an agreement to be approved by the Assembly of States Parties to this 
Statute and thereafter concluded by the President of the Court on its behalf.‖  
As a preliminary remark just briefly it should be mentioned why Article 2 
Rome Statute is necessary. If the Court had been established by an 
amendment of the UN Charter, it would have been a judicial organ of 
the United Nations. Had it been established by a resolution of the 
Security Council or the General Assembly it would have been a 
subsidiary organ of the Security Council or the General Assembly. The 
ICC was established by a multilateral treaty. Accordingly it has 
international legal personality (Article 4 Rome Statute).69 That renders 
the Court an entirely separate institution requiring the creation of a link 
with the United Nations.70 
aa. The ordinary meaning and the context of Article 2 Rome 
Statute 
The Court ―shall‖ be brought into ―relationship‖ with the United Nations. 
The wording ―shall‖ indicates the mandatory character of this provision. 
It is not in the left to the Court`s discretion whether to enter into such an 
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agreement. ―Relationship by an agreement‖ in itself does not give a hint 
on the supposed content of the agreement.71  
Taking into account the Relationship Agreement72, one must accept 
that Article 2 Rome Statute was only interpreted as a mandatory 
provision in regard to the functional relationship between the ICC and 
the SC. The agreement concerns, inter alia, reciprocal representation 
(article 4), exchange of information (article 5), reports to the UN (article 
6), proposals by the Court for matters to be considered for by the 
United Nations (article 7), personal arrangements (article 8), 
administrative cooperation (article 9), services and facilities (article 10), 
access to the United Nations Headquarters (article 11), laissez-passer 
(article 12) and financial matters (article 13).The Relationship 
Agreement only deals with certain aspects of the relationship, leaving 
out crucial aspects such as the coordination between the role of the 
Security Council and the judicial role of the ICC in maintenance of 
international peace and security73, those are to be found in the Rome 
Statute itself (see Articles 5, 13(b), 16)74.  
bb.Conclusion regarding Article 2 Rome Statute 
One first hint on the substantive analysis regarding the relationship 
between the Court and the Security Council is already to be found at 
this stage of the present study in Article 2 of the Rome Statute. 
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Establishing the Court by means of a multilateral treaty renders it an 
entirely separate institution.75 Only for that reason a formal link between 
those two institutions had to be established. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the underlying idea in the first place was to create an 
independent body, hierarchically not subordinate to the Security 
Council but rather, metaphorically expressed, being another link in a 
chain maintaining and restoring peace and justice on an international 
level. Furthermore, one has to take into account the position of the 
provision within in the Rome Statute. It is the second provision, 
indicating the importance of the establishment of such link. 
b) Article 5 (1) (d), (2) Rome Statute – Crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court - Aggression  
Article 5 (1) (b) Rome Statute gives the Court jurisdiction over the crime 
of aggression. Article 5 (2) Rome Statute stipulates that: 
―The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a 
provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the 
crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise 
jurisdiction with respect to this crime such a provision shall be consistent with 
the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.‖ 
aa. The ordinary meaning and the context of Article 5 (2) Rome 
Statute 
The crime of aggression itself is not defined yet as well as the important 
issue what role the Security Council should play in the pre-
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determination for the crime of aggression.76 However, an act of 
aggression was defined, under international law, in the annex to UN 
General Assembly Resolution 3314 of 1974 (the so-called UN Definition 
of Aggression77). This resolution stipulates in Article 1 that an act of 
aggression is 
―[... ] the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of another state.‖ 
The phrase of interest in Article 5 (2) Rome Statute is: ―such a provision 
shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations.‖ The provision in question, again78, is of a mandatory 
character. What are ―the relevant provisions‖ mentioned in Article 5 (2) 
Rome Statute? Some scholars understand the wording of Article 5 (2) 
Rome Statute to be coded language for the so called ―Security Council 
trigger.‖79 Under Article 24 UN Charter, the Security Council has 
primary responsibility for maintaining world peace.80 It is common 
opinion that the precondition refers, in regard of the analyzed 
relationship, to Article 39 United Nations Charter.81 Article 39 UN 
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Charter stipulates the requirements for measures under Chapter VII82 
and is part of the UN Charter`s system of collective security. The 
Security Council has the power to take measures in accordance with 
Chapter VII UN Charter, intern alia, when an act of aggression takes 
place. Therefore, it is the Security Council´s responsibility, in 
accordance with the 1974 Definition, to determine whether acts of 
aggression take place. For that reason, when interpreting Article 5 (2) 
Rome Statute one can only argue that ―consistent with the relevant 
provisions‖ refers specifically to Article 39 UN Charter. 
bb.Conclusion regarding Article 5 (2) Rome Statute 
Interpreting the Rome Statute in a stringent manner, at this point of the 
paper, does not allow any further discussion on the different points of 
view regarding the definition of the crime of aggression. So far, it is 
important to understand exactly what provisions regarding the balance 
of power between the ICC and the Security Council are already 
engraved in the Rome Statute. Hence, by referring to the Charter of the 
United Nations, Article 5 (2) Rome Statute stipulates conditions that 
need to be fulfilled when defining the crime of aggression, especially 
the clarification of the relationship to UN Charter.83 Article 5 Rome 
Statute gives the Court jurisdiction over the ―most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole‖ in paragraph 1, 
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while in paragraph 2 the role of the United Nations (or as shown above, 
rather the role of the SC) is mentioned in regard to the crime of 
aggression. So far it becomes obvious how important the relationship 
between the ICC and the Security Council was for the drafters of the 
Rome Statute. In the first 5 Articles the Council is mentioned twice, 
excluding the preamble. 
c) Article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute – Exercise of jurisdiction 
―The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in 
article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if: [...] 
b) A situation in which one or more crimes appears to have been committed is 
referred to the prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations.‖ 
aa. The ordinary meaning and context of Article 13 (b) Rome 
Statute 
A situation is a conflict that is to be defined by temporal, geographical 
and personal parameters; it is not a specific case. The situation has to 
be referred to the Prosecutor. The referral has to be in written when 
forwarded to the prosecutor according to the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence. To act ―under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations‖ necessarily obliges the Council to determine a threat or breach 
to the world peace according to Article 39 UN Charter.84 This 
enforcement power of the Security Council binds all members of the 
United Nations. According to Article 12 Rome Statute the Court has 
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jurisdiction if the conduct in question occurred on a state party`s 
territory or if the accused is national to a state that is party to the Rome 
Statute. By referring a situation to the ICC the Courts jurisdiction can be 
extended to the territory of a state that is not party to the Rome 
Statute.85 Therefore, Article 13 (b) Rome Statute, on one hand triggers 
the jurisdiction of the Court and on the other hand, may create 
jurisdiction ―in the case of crimes committed on the territory of a State 
that has not86‖ signed the Rome Statute. Noteworthy is the creation of 
the Courts jurisdiction without a need to comply with the requirements 
of Article 12 Rome Statute. For that reason Article 13 (b) Rome Statute 
is called fast-track-proceeding.87 The Council is obviously assigned a 
paramount role in the trigger mechanisms88. 
Even though the Security Council can refer a situation, it does not 
mean the usual mechanisms provided in the Rome Statute do not 
apply, and the prosecutor opens investigations automatically.89 First, 
the prosecutor has to determine if there is reasonable basis to proceed 
and initiate an investigation (Article 53 Rome Statute). According to 
Article 53 (1) (b) Rome Statute he also has to consider whether ―the 
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case is or would be admissible under article 17.‖90 Additionally, if the 
prosecutor concludes that there is no reasonable basis to proceed the 
investigation regarding to Article 17 Rome Statute, the prosecutor has 
to inform the Security Council (Article 53 (2) (b)). Finally, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber can determine the admissibility. 
bb.The Darfur Situation 
On the basis of the Security Council referral regarding the situation in 
the Darfur region, some general issues relating with Article 13 (b) will 
be discussed. Starting with the question of admissibility (Article 17 
Rome Statute) and if it has to be determined when the Security Council 
is referring a situation to the ICC. 
Some scholars were debating that a Security Council referral would 
exclude a further admissibility test under Article 17 Rome Statute and 
that the question intentionally was left open in the Rome Statute91 In 
addition it was argued that Article 18 Rome Statute does not mention 
Article 13 (b) Rome Statute and therefore, one can conclude the 
prosecutor has to open investigations.92 Consequently, one can discuss 
if the SC`s power to refer situations to the Court enables the Council to 
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shape the ICC`s jurisdiction.93 In that context the Darfur case serves as 
a very good example regarding the balance of power between the ICC 
and the Security Council especially regarding jurisdictional and 
admissibility issues.  
 Complementarity and Admissibility 
In 2005, for the first time, the Darfur situation was referred to the ICC by 
the Security Council.94 Darfur is a region of the Sudan, which is not 
party to the Rome Statute. The Prosecutor in this case believed that he 
was required to determine whether the case was admissible pursuant to 
provisions of Article 17 Rome Statute.95 The Rome Statute, in 
paragraph 10 of its preamble mentions the complementarity of the 
Court in relation to national jurisdictions. Article 17 Rome Statute refers 
to paragraph 10 Preamble of the Rome Statute and to Article 1 Rome 
Statute. Therefore, a referral of the Security Council can be divided into 
two procedural steps. In a first step the Security Council ‗confers 
                                            
93
 See: Scheffer, David. "Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court." 
Cornell International Law Journal, 2001-2002: 47-90, 48. 
94
 UN-Security Council, Resolution 1593 of 31 March 2005, UN Doc. S/RES/1593 
(2005) 
95
 Sharon, Schabas, in: Triffterer, 570 marginal no. 16; The prosecutor, Mr. Moreno 
Ocampo, stated in UN Doc. S/PV.5216, 2: ―In the light of the complementarity regime 
and article 53(1)(b) of the Statute, I am required to consider whether there could be 
cases that would be admissible within the situation in Darfur. The Office has studied 
Sudanese institutions, laws and procedures. We have sought information on any 
national proceedings that may have been undertaken in relation to crimes in Darfur. 
We have also analysed the multiple ad hoc mechanisms that were created by 
Sudanese authorities in 2004 in the context of the conflict in Darfur, including the 
committees against rape, the special courts and the specialized courts that replaced 
them, the national commission of inquiry and other ad hoc judicial committees and 
non-judicial mechanisms. Following that analysis, I determined that there are cases 
that would be admissible in relation to the Darfur situation. That decision does not 
represent a determination on the Sudanese legal system as such but is essentially a 
result of the absence of criminal proceedings related to the cases on which my Office 
will focus.‖ 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
jurisdiction‘ to the Court96 deriving from Chapter VII UN Charter, to the 
Court. The Court then, has jurisdiction over the referred situation, but 
that does not necessarily proof a case within the situation admissible. 
Even though one may argue that if the Security Council has the power 
to stop an investigation (Article 16 Rome Statute) this may also mean 
that the Council has the power to require an investigation without 
further review of this decision by the Court97 In cases of Security 
Council referrals the ICC must be seen as successor to the ICTY and 
the ICTR and therefore such referrals cannot be bound by the Rome 
Statute´s ordinary rules regarding complementarity.98 But those 
arguments cannot convince, due to the fact that in a second step, the 
prosecutor and eventually the Pre-Trial Chamber, can determine 
(Article 19 Rome Statute99) whether a case is admissible regarding the 
general provisions of the ICC. Consequently, Article 13 Rome Statute 
stipulates:  
―[first step] The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime 
referred to in article 5 [second step] in accordance with the provisions of this 
statute [...]‖ 
As the phrase ―in accordance with the provision‖ clearly indicates, 
Article 17 Rome Statute, since it is a provision of the Statute, has to be 
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adhered to whatsoever.100 In the Darfur case the prosecutor, as proven 
above, determined the admissibility and Pre-Trial Chamber I took the 
admissibility issue up in the warrant of arrest against Ahmad Harun and 
Ali Kushayb and in the one against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir .101 
The Pre-Trial Chamber did not formally determine the admissibility but 
in both cases it referred to the admissibility accepting it to be a part of 
the requirements even for Security Council referrals.102 
Taking that into account, one cannot argue, the Security Council 
shapes the ICC‘s jurisdiction. It does extent its jurisdiction in cases 
referred to under Article 13 (b) where a the situation is related to a 
state, that is not party to the Rome Statute, but it does not shape the 
ICC`s jurisdiction in that regard. Therefore, in the Darfur case, the 
prosecutor had to determine the admissibility and was right in 
―believing‖ so.103 
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 The jurisdictional exemption 
Another jurisdictional issue concerning the Darfur referral was highly 
discussed. The Darfur Resolution 1593 states in operative paragraph 6 
(hereinafter referred to as paragraph 6) that the Security Council: 
―Decides that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a 
contributing State outside Sudan which is not party to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that 
contributing State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to 
operations in Sudan established or authorized by the Council or the African 
Union, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by that 
contributing state.‖ 
Paragraph 6 of Resolution 1593 developed out of an initiative of the 
United States.104 The resolution ultimately excludes all nationals of all 
jurisdictions which are not party to the Rome Statute and were acting 
under authorization of the Council or the African Union.105 The 
jurisdictional immunity provided in the resolution, is a formal limitation 
that might be seen contrary to the ratio of Article 13 (b) Rome 
Statute.106 Prior to adopting the resolution a lot of concerns were 
raised. Brazil for example saw paragraph 6 as a ―legal exception that is 
inconsistent in international law‖ and Denmark was concerned about 
paragraph 6 ‗killing‘ the Court`s credibility.107 Even though, finally, the 
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interest to fight impunity was given more weight and the resolution was 
adopted and referred to the Court.108  
This raises the question which effect the jurisdictional exemption can 
have under the Rome Statute. 
―Chapter VII measures taken by the Security Council must be in 
response to a threat to international peace and security, once the 
Council has made a determination to this effect.‖109 In the past the 
Security Council has determined quite broadly what constitutes a threat 
to international peace.110 In the Darfur situation a threat clearly existed. 
But taking a glance at the drafting history of Article 13 in relation with 
Article 16 (the deferral right) one sees, that through the change of 
Article 23(3) ILC Draft, it was intended to allow the Court to function 
independently.111 The drafters had the intention to demonstrate the ICC 
as an independent institution with little interference by the Security 
Council.112 Can the Security Council legally bind the ICC with such a 
resolution?  
Nothing in the UN Charter authorizes the Council to act in a manner 
that modifies another treaty.113 Therefore, paragraph 6 of Resolution 
1593 is incompatible with the Rome Statute, as the Statute does not 
allow individuals to be exempted from its jurisdiction on basis of a 
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referral.114 It is for that reason, as explained in Chapter II, that the 
Security Council only has competence to refer situations instead of 
cases.115 In that regard, a parallel to the referral of Uganda can be 
drawn. Uganda referred its conflict to the ICC in a way as to exclude 
some individuals of the Courts jurisdiction and the prosecutor 
responded that no such exception ratione personae could be 
effective.116 But in the Darfur case the prosecutor he had no such 
objectives.117 The contrary is true; he stated in his press release 
regarding the opening of investigations that: 
―The investigation will be impartial and independent, focusing on the 
individuals who bear the greatest criminal responsibility for crimes committed 
in Darfur.‖
118
 
International law does not give a clear answer with respect to the 
consequences of an illegal act by an international organization, or an 
organ of that organization.119 Therefore the resolution must be 
interpreted in the light of the UN Charter.120 States that are members to 
the UN and the Rome Statute must respectively fulfill their obligations 
under the UN Charter and the Rome Statute. Under Article 25 UN 
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Charter a resolution of the Council can bind member states. But the 
Court itself is not a member to the United Nations; it is an international 
organization and therefore cannot be bound by a resolution under 
Article 25 UN Charter. 
Regardless of the illegality of paragraph 6 of Resolution 1593, until 
now, neither was the referral rejected, nor paragraph 6 and there is no 
perspective it will be rejected in the future. The pre-trial chamber I 
issued two warrants of arrest121 and it seems as if the Court so far 
silently accepted the jurisdictional exemption. 
cc. Conclusion – Article 13 (b) Rome Statute 
Article 13 (b) Rome Statute impressively demonstrates the thin line 
between legal and political reasoning. The Darfur referral, on one hand 
gave the Court jurisdiction over a situation in a state that is not party to 
the Rome Statute. The prosecutor applied the admissibility test and 
proved the independence of the office of the prosecutor in that context. 
Furthermore, through mentioning the admissibility, Pre-Trial Chamber I 
accepted admissibility and complementarity to be a formal requirement 
which also plays a role regarding Security Council referrals. On the 
other hand, it seems, as if the Court, in order to fight impunity, is 
accepting the jurisdictional exemption within paragraph 6 of Resolution 
1593. And it seems as if the veto power in the Security Council controls 
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the referral functions to be exercised by the Council.122 The United 
States did not use their veto but they insisted on paragraph 6. Only the 
compromise of accepting immunity under paragraph 6 of Resolution 
1593 allowed the referral to be forwarded to the Court. 
d) Article 16 Rome Statute – Deferral of investigation or 
prosecution 
―No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under 
this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a 
resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has 
requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the 
Council under the same conditions.‖ 
aa. The ordinary meaning and context of Article 16 Rome 
Statute 
The Rome Statute does not define „investigation― or „prosecution― but 
indicates, in consideration of Articles 14, 15 and 55 that ―investigation‖ 
involves actions that may be taken with respect to a situation and/or 
individual.123 Investigation may be defined that it 
―[…] comprises the totality of investigative actions undertaken by the 
Prosecutor under the ICC Statute after an investigation has started in order to 
ensure the confirmation of charges against an individual suspected of having 
committed crimes within the Court`s jurisdiction.‖
124
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 ―Prosecution‖ always involves actions taken by the Prosecutor and 
realistically those actions that are taken against an individual that have 
been confirmed in accordance with Article 61 Rome Statute. 
Furthermore, it may be assumed that prosecution ends with the 
rendering of a final judgment.125 Article 16 states that the Security 
Council in a resolution may request that no prosecution is ―commenced‖ 
or ―proceeded‖ with. An investigation is commenced if: 
―the Prosecutor determines that there is a ―reasonable basis to proceed‖ with 
an investigation and renders decision to that effect.‖
 126
 
But how gets the Security Council to know that an investigation is 
commenced? In the Rome Statute there is no provision that obliges the 
prosecutor to inform the Security Council about the commencement of 
an investigation but in the early practice of the office of the Prosecutor 
the opening of investigations was announced through a press 
release.127 If the Council requests that no investigation or prosecution 
may be commenced or proceeded in a certain case, Article 16 Rome 
Statute leaves open the procedural and evidentiary issues that may 
arise.128 
Additionally, Article 16 Rome Statute requires for a resolution adopted 
under Chapter VII UN Charter. Having fulfilled these preconditions the 
investigation or prosecution may be stopped for 12 months. The period 
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is renewable and no limit is foreseen regarding the repetitions to renew 
the request. Article 16 Rome Statute only states that the deferral may 
be renewed under the same conditions. The wording suggests for a 
new determination regarding the preconditions under Chapter VII UN 
Charter (especially Article 39 UN Charter) and that a new deferral 
would apply for another 12 month period, not a shorter or longer one.129 
bb.Deferrals in practice – Security Council Resolution 1422 and 
1487 
The Security Council is acting under Article 24 UN Charta as an agent 
of the member states of the United Nations in accordance with the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations. For that reason one can 
conclude, the Security Council can only act in a manner that is 
constrained by the norms of international law. Following a brief 
overview will be given on the deferral resolutions adopted so far, 
namely Resolution 1422130, 1487.131 They touch upon the jurisdiction of 
the ICC. 
Resolution 1422 was born out of the United States request to grant 
immunity to US soldiers in Bosnia and Herzegovina from the ICC`s 
jurisdiction for a period of one year.132 The United States threatened to 
veto a renewal for the Council`s mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.133 
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Finally Resolution 1422 was adopted as a compromise. In operative 
paragraph 1 the Council requests: 
―consistent with the provisions of Article 16 of the Rome Statute, that the ICC, 
if a case arises involving current or former officials or personnel from a 
contributing State not a Party to the Rome Statute […] shall for a twelve-
months period starting 1 July 2002 not commence or proceed with 
investigation or prosecution of any such case, unless the Security Council 
decides otherwise.‖ 
Even though the resolution was highly controversial, in 2003, 
Resolution 1487 was adopted, renewing Resolution 1422 and repeating 
the request for another 12 month.134 The resolution was accepted by 
the Council even though it was illegal and inconsistent with the Rome 
Statute.135 
cc. Conclusion regarding Article 16 Rome Statute 
In theory, Article 16 Rome Statute is a well balanced compromise136 
between the power of the Security Council under Chapter VII and the 
independence of the Court. The original intention of Article 16 Rome 
Statute was to release suspect of investigations allow decent peace 
negotiations.137 The practice, on the contrary, proved the Security 
Council as an organ of the UN to be very powerful and even rather 
disturbing powerful in the fight against impunity, as proven by 
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Resolutions 1422 and 1487.138 Even though one has to take into 
account that it is not the power of the Security Council in general it is 
rather the power of some of its permanent member, namely the United 
States, within that organ that make the organ itself seem quite powerful 
in relation to the SC. 
Another weakness of Article 16 Rome Statute should just briefly be 
mentioned. The adoption of a resolution under Chapter VII UN Charter 
does not necessarily entail that action by the Council relating to the 
case under consideration is underway.139 The Council can stop 
investigations without having to deal with the situation in another 
way.140 The ICC has to adhere to the resolution and the Council at the 
same time has any freedom to act at will. 
e) Article 115 Rome Statute – Funds of the Court and the 
Assembly of State Parties 
―The expenses of the Court and the Assembly of State Parties, including its 
Bureau and subsidiary bodies as provided for in the budget decided by the 
Assembly of States Parties, shall be provided by the following sources: 
a) Assessed contributions made by States Parties 
b) Funds provided by the United Nations, subject to the approval of the 
General Assembly, in particular in relation to the expenses incurred due to 
referrals by the Security Council.‖ 
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aa. Ordinary meaning and context of Article 115 Rome Statute 
In the context of an interpretation of Article 115 Rome Statute, in 
consideration of the balance of power between the ICC and the 
Security Council, Article 115 (b) is of interest as it mentions referrals by 
the Security Council. The second source of funds provided for is the 
United Nations. The phrase ―subject to the approval of the General 
Assembly‖ appears to have no legal significance in a sense that it 
states the obvious. But one has to read it in relation with the United 
Nations Charter and the fact, that the Rome Statute cannot bind the 
United Nations.141 Therefore one has to understand it rather as a 
―reflection upon the fact that an agreement cannot create obligations on 
behalf of third parties.‖142 Interesting is also the wording ―in particular‖ it 
might be understood as a hint that there might be other situations 
where the United Nations could be called upon to contribute to the 
Court`s funds.143 Article 115 Rome Statute is mandatory as it uses 
―shall‖. But as explained above the Rome Statute cannot legally bind 
the UN. What does ―shall‖ in context with Security Council referrals 
mean? The provision may intend to oblige the Court not to act when a 
situation is referred without the accordant funding. As ―shall‖ indicates 
the compelling character of the provision especially in consideration 
with provisions of the Rome Statute using the same language. 
Expenses of Security Council referrals are incurred due to the service 
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of the Court to deal with an Security Council referral.144 Therefore, it 
seems more than appropriate that the United Nations should bear the 
costs of the latter.145 If the funding is denied, the Court then was 
obliged to act according to the premiss:‖If there is no money available 
for investigations and trials, there simply will not be any investigations 
and trials.‖146  
Again, the Darfur referral can serve as an example for the practice.  
Operative paragraph 7 of Resolution 1593 (hereinafter referred to as 
paragraph 7) states, that ―none of the expenses incurred in connection 
with that referral, shall be borne by the United Nations.‖ Paragraph 7 
was a further compromise for the United States not to veto the 
referral.147 The funding scheme provided for in the Rome Statute was 
violated. The Statute is not clear about the consequences, whether the 
prosecutor or the Court may reject a referral on the grounds of absent 
United Nations funding.148 According to the mandatory wording of 
Article 115, theoretically the Court, including the prosecutor, was 
obliged to deny dealing with the referred situation, as long as the United 
Nations was not approving the funding.149 Practically, the Court did not 
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touch upon that issue and the Assembly of States Parties bears the 
expenses, now.150 
bb.Conclusion regarding Article 115 (b) Rome Statute 
Article 115 (b) Rome Statute, in its wording, is an adequate provision 
for balancing the relationship between the Court and the SC. But, as it 
was proven in practice, through the Darfur referral, it lacks a stringent 
enforcement. The Security Council decides not to bear the expenses 
and the Court accepts without protesting. Taking into account that the 
Security Council is acting on behalf of the United Nations (Article 24 (2) 
UN Charter) the Court`s behavior is completely inscrutable on the 
subject of the Darfur referral. I suggest reading Article 115 Rome 
Statute as a mandatory provision, which, in cases of Security Council 
referrals, does not allow the Court to act without a guaranteed funding 
by the United Nations. 
2. The Object and Purpose of the Rome Statute 
The object and purpose of a statute is typically to find in the 
preamble.151 
The Preamble of the Rome Statute states the object and purpose quite 
clearly. In paragraph 5 it articulates the primary purpose 
―Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to 
contribute to the prevention of such crimes.‖ 
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In Triffterer`s opinion ―all Articles of the Statute and the Court, 
exercising its jurisdiction on the basis of the Statute, serve the purpose 
‗to prevent and repress' crimes under international law.‖152 Those 
responsible for the ―most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole‖ (paragraph 4 of the Preamble) must be 
punished. The relationship with the United Nations is mentioned twice; 
in paragraph 6 of the Preamble in association with the ‗Principles and 
Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations‘ and especially the ban 
of the threat or use of force. And in paragraph 9 of the Preamble, 
although the ICC is an independent institution, it is laid down that the 
ICC cannot operate detached from the United Nations. Though, the 
Preamble confirms a determination ―to establish an independent 
permanent ICC.‖153 One can sum up the object and purpose as the aim 
to fight impunity while not violating the principles and purposes of the 
world community. Although in many cases the ICC is facing a certain 
difficulty. On one hand, it is determined to fight impunity and on the 
other hand, it must make jurisdictional and financial compromises in 
order to do so.154 
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cc. Conclusion Chapter III – The Role of the Security Council as 
intended by the Rome Statute 
The interpretation of the Rome Statute concerning the role of the 
Security Council is evidence for a certain power pattern. The relevant 
and analyzed Articles of the Rome Statute all emphasize the United 
Nation`s task to maintain and restore peace within the world under 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The ICC as an independent 
institution must adhere to Security Council requests as long as they do 
not violate the well balanced system of the Rome Statute. The power of 
both institutions only inter-mingles in specific cases when a threat or 
breach to international peace occurs which was determined by the 
Security Council (Articles 13 (b) and 16 Rome Statute). Otherwise, they 
can act independently. Theoretically, there is a thin line drawn in the 
provisions of the Rome Statute that is to safeguard the ICC from 
political influence of the Security Council and the United Nations. 
Practice, however, has shown a different scheme. The Security 
Council, which is highly influenced by its permanent members, can refer 
a situation by excluding a specific group of persons, as well as 
excluding the relevant funding, and still the ICC is willing to take up 
proceedings without legally challenging the resolution of the Council. 
This is the point where the fine line, drawn by the Rome Statute, begins 
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to disappear, to the Court`s disadvantage and its independence and 
towards a politically influenced Court. 155 To put it in Sarooshi`s words: 
―In the case of the ICC the mandate is relatively clear, the achievement of 
justice by means of an international criminal process in relation to the crimes 
within the Court`s jurisdiction; while in the case of the Security Council its 
overriding objective under the UN Charter is the maintenance or restoration of 
peace and security, which may not include in a particular case the 
achievement of justice.‖
156
 
However, if one is disregarding the practice, the provisions of the Rome 
Statute were able to safeguard the Courts independence from the 
political influence of the Security Council.
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IV Should the ‘intended role’ of the Security Council as 
laid down in the Rome Statute influence the definition 
of the Crime of Aggression? 
In Chapter IV the balance of power, as defined in Chapter III, will serve 
as a guideline for the discussion on the crime of aggression. 
Furthermore, by analyzing the influence of the ―power pattern‖ on the 
crime of aggression, Chapter IV serves as a Conclusion regarding the 
balance of power between the ICC and the Security Council 
1. The Genesis of the Crime of Aggression 
In the aftermath of World War II, in the Charta of the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg157, for the first time, the crime of 
aggression was included into an international treaty.158 Already prior to 
the Nuremberg Statute there had been early attempts for a ban on 
war.159 Thus, the concept was quite new at the time, since war in the 
19th and early 20th century was considered a legitimate political tool.160 
                                            
157
 The Nuremberg trial was legally based on the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal (IMT Charter), which was a result of a negotiating process between the allied 
powers. The IMT Charter was included as an appendix to the London Agreement 
signed by the British, French, Soviet, and United States representatives on behalf of 
their governments on 8 August 1945; Hummrich (2001), 53. 
158
 Werle (2005), 481; Petty, Keith A. "Sixty Years in the Making: The Definition of 
Aggression for the International Criminal Court." Hastings International & Comparative 
Law Review, September 2008: 531-554, 532 et seq. 
159
 See the Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy of 
27 August 1928, the so-called Kellog-Briand Pact. For an further information on the 
concept of aggression going as far back as to the writings of Aristotele see: Bassiouni, 
Ferencz (2008), 207 et seq. 
160
 Werle (2009), 476; Kurth (2005), 89. 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
The Nuremberg Charter called the ‗crime of aggression‘ in Article 6 
‗crime against peace‘ and defined it as 
―the planning, preparing, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war 
in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or 
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of 
the foregoing.‖  
The Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, as well as the follow-up trials, 
contributed to the creation of customary international law, criminalizing 
the perpetration and waging of aggressive war.161 Since then, 
numerous attempts were made to define aggression, like in 1954 in the 
International Law Commission`s Draft Code of Offences against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind.162 Though, a prohibition on the threat 
or use of force was included in Article 2(4) UN Charta.163 In 1974, the 
General Assembly agreed upon a definition regarding an ‗act of 
aggression.‘164 Under Article 1 of the definition of the United Nations, an 
act of aggression is ―the use of armed force by a state against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another 
state.‖165 But still, an international compromise on the definition of a 
crime or war of aggression was not agreed upon as the definition of the 
crime of aggression necessarily needs to differ from the definition of 
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aggression for the purpose of political determination by the Security 
Council166 Especially in regard of the principle of legality a crime needs 
to be specifically defined and its elements clearly stated.167 
During the PrepCom and the Rome Conference it was not 
compromised either.168 The Rome Conference, in its final act, 
―authorized the Preparatory Commission to prepare a proposal for 
consideration by the Review Conference.‖169 In 2002, a Special 
Working Group on the Crime of Aggression for the Assembly of States 
Parties to the Rome Statute (hereinafter referred to as Special Working 
Group) was established as a successor to the Preparatory 
Commission.170 
It was the task of the Preparatory Commission and its successor, the 
Special Working Group, to prepare an agreement that would cover: 
 a definition of the crime of aggression; 
 the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction 
with respect to this crime; and 
 the elements of this crime.171 
The Preparatory Commission laid down its results regarding the crime 
of aggression in a Discussion Paper172 (Discussion Paper 2002). The 
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Special Working Group, in 2007, after 5 years of substantive work, 
published another discussion paper (Discussion Paper 2007).173 
In the following it will be concentrated on the issues concerning the 
conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction, since it 
includes the role of the Security Council, an issue still to be solved.174 
2. The Security Council and the Crime of Aggression 
The role of the Security Council regarding the criminal proceedings for 
the crime of aggression is highly controversial.175 Hence, the 
determination of aggression is the most difficult hurdle to overcome.176 
―The complexity is rooted in the fact that it brings together highly 
political world of the Security Council, dominated by the rule of power 
and the international justice world of the ICC, governed by the rule of 
law.‖177 The primary responsibility to maintain world peace is occupied 
by the Security Council under Article 24 of the UN Charter. Therefore, 
the opinion was shared that the Council should also enjoy primary 
responsibility in determining an act of aggression as an element of the 
crime of aggression. The Court would only be allowed to prosecute 
after a pre-determination by the Council.178 Therefore, the question 
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remains whether ―state aggression is a purely political question for the 
Security Council or whether the Court may act on its own.‖179 
In the ILC draft it was absolutely clear that a prior determination by the 
Council was needed (see Article 23 (3) ILC Draft). Though, in the 
negotiations process views were diverging as the Security Council was 
unable to serve as a legal filter; it was a political body that was to 
decide for its own reasons in each specific case whether or not a state 
act of aggression would have been committed.180  
In the Special Working Group the view was commonly shared that the 
Court at least ―shall first ascertain whether the Security Council has 
made a determination of an act of aggression committed by the State 
concerned."181 The rationale behind those proposals is the Council`s 
important responsibility under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to maintain 
and restore international peace and security.182 Though, the five 
permanent members of the Security Council do favor the so-called 
―exclusivity thesis,‖ which allows only the Council to trigger the Courts 
jurisdiction regarding the crime of aggression by determining that a 
state has committed an act of aggression.183 The thesis is based on 
Article 24 UN Charter. But one may argue that ‗primary‘ does not mean 
‗exclusive‘.184 Additionally, the exclusive right of the Security Council to 
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trigger the Court‘s jurisdiction would give the permanent members the 
possibility to veto every decision that is supposed to be taken to their 
disadvantage. Furthermore, while the ―act of aggression‖ is more 
amenable to legal determination, the ―threat to the peace‖ is more of a 
political concept.185 
One of the latest discussions was in regard of the so-called ―red-light‖ 
proposal, wherein the Council, similar to Article 16 Rome Statute, would 
have the right to stop investigations or prosecutions if, in its opinion, no 
act of aggression took place.186 Though, the ―red-light‖ proposal was 
rejected by most parties. ―The point was also made that article 2 of the 
resolution dealt with the first use of armed force by a State, which would 
prima facie be considered an act of aggression. In contrast, the purpose 
of the Court‘s proceedings was to determine individual criminal 
responsibility. ―187  
It is still under discussion if the Court could take up investigations even 
if the Council refuses to determine aggression. 
Right now, aggression in the draft of the Special Working Group is 
defined as a certain act of aggression, which needs to be determined 
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by the Security Council.188 Broad agreement exists over the Council 
having the right to this determination.189 The question remains whether 
the Court can also act on its own in cases where the Security Council 
refuses to determine an act of aggression.190 It is uncertain whether in 
the end the UN General Assembly or the International Court of Justice 
will get a right of determination in those cases.191 
3. Conclusion 
The definition of aggression as foreseen in Article 8 bis of the Draft 
would hardly be consistent with the balance of power as envisaged by 
the Rome Statute.192 As proven above, the Rome Statute provides for a 
very well balanced relationship between the ICC and the Security 
Council. Though, in theory this balance is very well structured, the 
example of the Darfur referral has already shown the political power of 
the Security Council which can affect the Court regardless of the 
provisions of the Rome Statute trying to circumvent such influence. 
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Now, if the definition for the crime of aggression allows for a pre-
determination by the Council, the definition does not even theoretically 
comply with the standards foreseen in the Rome Statute. The politically 
driven Council was to have the power to decide a legal question. In 
comparison with the other international crimes provided for in Article 5 
Rome Statute which are within the jurisdiction of the Court, aggression 
would be the only one, which depends completely on a political 
determination. The Court was to become the over-politicized organ as 
some scholars already see it today.193 Furthermore, one can take into 
account the argument of Gaja as he states: 
―One cannot assume that the absence of a finding by the Security Council that 
aggression occurred necessarily implies that in the Security Council‘s view 
there is no aggression and that therefore conflict would arise with a positive 
finding by the ICC that an individual has committed a crime of aggression.‖
194
 
Generally speaking, the right to refer a situation and the deferral right in 
the Rome Statute give the Security Council the power to initiate the 
prosecutors work or, in case of the deferral, to stop investigations or 
prosecutions through a resolution. For the crime of aggression, in my 
opinion, it would be sufficient and in accord with the Rome Statute, if 
the Council was to have the same powers as it has regarding the 
further crimes of Article 5 Rome Statute. The right of maintaining and 
restoring peace does not inter-mingle with a determination of the ICC to 
investigate a case or prosecute an individual for a crime. If the Council 
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has determined a certain conduct as act of aggression the Court may 
take up that determination for its own argumentation regarding the 
crime. That way, the judicial action of the Court would not depend on 
the willpower of an executive body.195 
 
Words: 10429 
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